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This article studies the sources and the development of the 
military conflict in Ukraine. It is widely accepted that a conflict is 
a natural state for the human society, but the nuclear threat 
hanging over the world has made the problem of national and 
international security much more topical and urgent. Different 
countries try to solve conflicts peacefully using political means. 
The struggle for the natural, human, territorial, financial, 
economic, information, humanitarian and other resources is one 
reason for the conflict between Russia and Ukraine. An 
ideological split is another cause for the act of war between these 
two countries. The war in Ukraine can be classified as a hybrid 
that includes the use of the protest potential of the population, 
accompanied by the covert military operations with the 
implementation of the adversarial informational methods and the 
special operation forces. The scope and negative after-effects of 
the military conflict are specified including the killed, the 
wounded, the annexed territories, the ruined industry and social 
infrastructure. The prolonged tactics of the conflict solution can 
bring it to the “frozen state” that automatically dooms the 
European and NATO perspectives of Ukraine for an indefinite 
period and can even result in the loss of Ukrainian sovereignty. 
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Introduction  
Every historical epoch is specified with ideological struggle. Defending 
the political course of the national and social development does not always take 
place in the peaceful environment for the controversial issues solution. The 
problems of the prevention of military conflicts, global and environmental 
safety support, and poverty reduction do not exhaust the list of threats hanging 
over the human civilization. Taking into account all these complicated multi-
faceted challenges in the world arena, every country has to guarantee military-
strategic and humanitarian balance, using its own efforts and resources as well 
as soliciting the help of international safety and security institutions. 
The foreign policy of the country preconditions its position in the 
international legal sphere. It is widely known that the international-legal 
position of the country is based on the same principles as the national political 
course and has the same aims as the geopolitics on the whole (Tunkin, 1970, p. 
307-308). Peaceful development plans based on the principles of mutual aid 
and support, rejection of global or local war propaganda, and impeding the 
nuclear proliferation can provide safety for both leading democracies and those 
that are just at the beginning of their democratic development. 
The creation of nuclear and other mass destruction weapons significantly 
changed the balance of political forces in the world. Lack of credible deterrents 
for the aggressive foreign diplomacy of some countries affect the formation of 
the international environment that would be favorable for social and military 
conflict resolution. Contemporary wars that use modern weapons cannot bring 
positive results in achieving any political goals. Human and material casualties 
will always be many times higher than the campaign results. Possible disastrous 
effects can become a real warning for those that strive for global or regional 
supremacy. Besides, the use of totally new weapons and military means make 
the solution of world problems absolutely unreasonable, in particular when it 
concerns historical conflicts between Western-minded and Eastern-minded 
progress values or socialist and capitalist ideas. 
Of course, human coexistence is naturally prone to conflicts that 
accompany the entire history of our civilization. Confrontation of judgements, 
competition of different viewpoints with the impossibility of compromise 
evidence the further social, political and ethnic crisis growth in any society 
(Dahrendorf, 1988, p. 13; Bernard, 1951, p. 243; Kriesberg, 1982, p. 17; 
Konstitutsionnoye pravo, 2002, p. 450). But significant changes in the balance 
of power in the world arena in favor of the “nuclear” countries with their 
powerful military potential leaves no chance for peaceful conflict resolution 
with no control over the performance of international safety contracts. In such 
a case, we do not mean a conflict as a dynamic phenomenon with the positive 
regulative influence, as a stimulator and a driving power for social and political 
changes (Coser, 1968, p. 79). All the forms of confrontation acquire the 
characteristic of a threat. Conflict can no longer be considered a permanent 
social state and the lack of conflict is not an unnatural extrinsic social situation 
that some experts consider a strange “reason for suspicions” concerning the 
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unrevolutionary way of the development of civilization (Dahrendorf, 1970, p. 
127). 
The threat of nuclear war hanging over the world made the problem of 
international and national safety protection more topical. Life as a human right 
must be in the center of any theoretical discussion and the practice of state-
building must apply various forms of political struggle instead of military 
conflict. 
It has been proved that the conflict is never closed till there is a subject for 
an obvious or hidden misunderstanding. It is important to avoid direct 
confrontation of hostile entities as achieving the liquidation of hotspots of 
tension can be quite possible over the longer term. 
The antithesis of war and peace is today the main antithesis that is 
discussed in society. The possiblility or impossibility of a new global war has 
become quite an unexpected problem for many countries. Politicians are 
searching for possible actions to be implemented to support global safety, but 
they cannot find any, Social organizations also feel quite bewildered and 
confused. The strong belief that highly-developed countries and global 
institutions can save the world from the threat of new global wars seems to be 
an illusion. The European Union arose from the ruins and horrors of the World 
War II, though currently there are some technical opportunities and endeavors 
of some countries to exceed these horrors. Military conflicts and wars arise in 
different parts of the world without any official declaration. 
It is quite symbolic that the conflict between Ukraine and Russia arose and 
is developing and can be considered the nerve center of the recent years in the 
territory of the former Soviet Union. Despite the declaration of democratic 
values in the Constitution, the USSR did not translate these values into action. 
The governing ideology of those times did not teach that a political system and 
its institutions need to function in accordance with the ideals of real democracy 
and sovereignty. The Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) that had 
no analogue to the western parliamentary parties was the only unit that had a 
governmental monopoly. The “leading and guiding force of the Soviet society 
and the nucleus of its political system” (Part 1, Article 6 of the Constitution of 
USSR) levelled the problem of values and democratic state structure (Nikolaev, 
2010). The ideological split between the countries of the entire Communist bloc 
beyond the Soviet Union and the western liberal countries complicated the 
development of the national leaders that might have tried to implement real 
democratic traditions capable of any reforms.  
All the growing discrepancies between the “fossilized”, authoritarian and 
centralized country like Russian Federation (RF) and Ukraine, a country that 
aspired to pursue pro-European civilized development and breakthrough in the 
social state, made the political situation more strained. Rejecting the post-war 
experience of peaceful conflict resolution, RF used the contrived pretext and 
military intervention as a way to resolve international conflicts. In fact, a 
political conflict turned into a military one. Non-recognition of freedom and 
democracy as the highest national political values became the basis of returning 
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the world agenda to the problems of war and peace and the reallocation of 
sovereign territories.  
Every person, including the political leaders, must respect the democratic 
principles that should be common for the state and the society. This can give 
growth to the common supra-national values that can, at a critical moment, stop 
the conflicts from arising between the states and between the nations (Krizis 
tsennostey, 2016). 
Taking into consideration the topicality of the conflict problem, especially 
when it concerns the military conflict in Ukraine, the polemical character of 
this research, its scientific and practical value, the works of Ukrainian and 
foreign scientists, public leaders and experts were analyzed. In addition, this 
article studies the military conflict in Ukraine, its background and effects, the 
specific role of the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine in their struggle with 
the aggressor with regard to the legal instruments available. A wide range of 
documents were used as a theoretical basis for this work to attract special 
attention to the pressing and complicated problem of the process of the 
formation of the modern state of Ukraine. 
 
Military conflict in Ukraine: on terminology  
The military conflict in the South-East of Ukraine has taken place during 
the last six years (2014-2020). Ukrainian law interprets the term “military 
conflict” with regard to its legal status. Thus, the Law of Ukraine “Оn National 
Security” specifies a “military conflict as a form of international or national 
controversy with bilateral use of armed forces; war and armed conflict are 
named as forms of military conflict” (Part 1, Article 1 of the Law). Such a 
definition corresponds with the position of some academics. Giddens says that 
military conflict is an armed conflict is a real military struggle between the 
political entities irrespective of the forms of the warfare, types and means 
mobilized by every party of the conflict (Giddens, 1989, р. 198).  
The concept of a declaration of war is an important war indicator though 
it is not the only one. The declaration of war is usually accompanied by the 
following significant features: 1) breaking diplomatic, consular, trade, 
economic, cultural and other relations between the countries; 2) cancelling any 
peacetime contracts and treaties except for the ones regulating the warfare or 
concluded specially in the event of war; 3) installing a special legal regime of 
the partial limitation of rights; transformation of the entire political system that 
starts performing some specific functions preconditioned by the war and aimed 
at the victory; 4) warfare in some territory (land, naval or air) that is named the 
theater of hostilities or the theater of war that has a potential for the 
development of hostile activities (Mezhdunarodnoye pravo, 1994, р. 349-350). 
Thus, a war is a social-political phenomenon that is the most acute form of the 
settlement of social-political, economic, ideological, national, religious, 
territorial and other controversies between the countries, nationalities, nations, 
classes and social groups by means of armed violence (Voyenni konflikty, 
2004, p. 10). 
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The Law of Ukraine “On the National Security” explains that a military 
conflict is an armed conflict between the countries (international armed conflict 
or the conflict on the state border) or between hostile parties within one territory 
(non-international or internal armed conflict) usually supported from outside 
(Part 7, Article 1 of the Law). 
An armed conflict is characterized by a high involvement of the local 
population with lethal results, the implementation of irregular paramilitary 
forces or militant groups, the wide implementation of sabotage and terrorist 
means, complicated moral-psychological environment of the warfare, 
involuntary diversion of forces and means to support displacement routes, 
regional and encampment safety as well as the risk of transformation into the 
local (international armed conflict) or the civil war (internal armed conflict) 
(Siryy, 2006, p. 124-134). 
Though the situation in the Luhansk and Donetsk regions and the Crimea 
meets the definition and characteristics of the internal military conflict, the real 
situation provides the evidence of a real war, though of a hybrid character, 
without an official war declaration. Nowadays, the term “war” is more often 
applied to the situation that cannot be qualified as an armed conflict. For 
example, information war, ideological war, war on terrorism (Ladynenko, 
2009, р. 136-150; Nikitin, 2018, р. 55-56). With the beginning of the hybrid 
war, the governmental authorities are given much greater powers and the power 
becomes more centralized. Ideological government machinery caters to the 
military aims and the economy is reorganized, partially or totally, for the 
military purposes. Material and moral powers of the state become more 
concentrated (Siryy, 2006, р. 132).  
The Chief of the General Staff of RF, General V. Gerasimov explained 
the concept of hybrid war at the meeting of the Academy of Military Science 
in 2010 as follows: “The accent of the confrontation methods applied shifts to 
the wide use of political, economic, information, humanitarian and other non-
military instruments with the involvement of the protest potential of the 
population. That is supplemented with the hidden military activities, including 
the media war and special forces involvement. The evident use of military 
forces usually starts at a definite stage often under the pretext of the 
peacemaking activities and crisis management to achieve the final success in 
the conflict” (Lyutkene, 2010, р. 171).  
The studies and projects of the General Staff were obviously applied 
the theories the former White Russian emigre E. Messner that have been 
distributed in Russia since 2006. The researcher framed the concept in 
accordance with which the future wars would be fought over the “national 
minds and spirits” instead of fighting over territories and resources. These 
would be rebellious wars or “wars of aggressors”, i.e. these would be the 
conflicts or special operations aimed at the national and social fights and 
disinformation. In fact, these would be psychological wars and their methods 
would imply provoking tension and propaganda activities. “Special purpose 
troops” or specially trained units for unconventional activities are the most 
useful in such wars. The result of such wars is never achieved on the battlefield. 
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The army is mostly used to terrify the population and the military forces of the 
potential enemy instead of discouraging the adversary forces (Mysli E. 
Messnera, (n.d.); Chupriy, Zahrebelnyy, 2017, р. 67).  
The war in Ukraine is aimed at the world repartition. This war is latently 
in the phase of the local colonial wars and has not turned into the global nuclear 
conflict yet, due to the fear of the nuclear weapons and unacceptable damage 
from the responsive attack. In addition, and most importantly, the pre-war 
geopolitical situation has not yet been formed (Voznyak, 2013). 
 
Reasons of military conflict in Ukraine  
The reasons for the warfare can be quite different. In Ukraine, it started 
through artificial reasons that were officially declared by the aggressor. In 
reality, the gropolitical background becomes important. For example, during 
three months after the Crimea was annexed by Russia, V. Putin appeared three 
times in public with the resume on the military campaign in such Ukrainian 
regions as Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol. On March 18, 
2014 he addressed the members of the State Duma and the Federal Council. On 
April 17 of the same year the President gave a large press-conference. On July 
1, he addressed the ambassadors and plenipotentiaries at the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. The conclusions he presented are summarised in the following 
table: 
March 18 April 18 July 1 
- Common history and 
common honor 
- The historical territory of 
South Russia 
- Reunification of the divided 
Russian nation 
- Correcting historical injustice 
- Life of Russians and Russian 
speaking people in the hostile, 
non-democratic and 
uncivilized environment 
- Response to deprivation of 
Russians of their historical 
memory, their forced 
assimilation and 20-year crisis 
in Ukraine 
- No legitimate power in Kyiv 
- Threats of repressions and 
punitive operations 
- Appeal of the Crimeans to 
protect them  
- Threat to the 
Russian speaking 
population 
- Wish of the local 
population  
- Saving the money 
for the fleet 
management in 
Sevastopol 
- Potential for 
shipbuilding and 
repairing in the 
Crimea 
- Source of pride and 
glory 
- Russian assistance 
for Ukraine for 
hundreds of billions 
of USD 
- NATO expansion 
to the East 





access to the 
Black Sea area 
- Supposed arrival 
of NATO into the 
Crimea 
- Shift in the force 
balance in the 
Black Sea region 
(strategic position 
of the Crimean 
Peninsula) 
- Possession of 
the area 
conquered since 
the times of Peter 
the Great 
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- The Kosovo case 
- No armed resistance 
- NATO expansion to the East 
- Rude, irresponsible and 
unprofessional Russia-
restricting policy of the West  
- Sovereignty of Russia and its 
interests in Ukraine 
- Striving of the Russian 
World for the re-establishment 
of unity 
- Respect to the territorial 
integrity of Ukraine 
- Inadmissibility of the 
banderization of the Crimea 
- Strategic position of the 
Crimean Peninsula 
- Threat of NATO for the 
South of Russia 
- Wish of the local population 
- Correcting 
historical injustice 
- Ethnic makeup of 
the Crimea 
- Supposed arrival of 
NATO into the 
Crimea 
- Response to the 
West in terms of 
defence missile talks 
- Strategic position 
of the Crimean 
Peninsula 
 
The comparison of speeches elucidated two main reasons of annexation 
that were declared in all the three cases: 
1. Strategic position of the Crimean Penninsula. 
2. Response to the hypothetical arrival of NATO troops to the Crimea. 
According to Putin, the Ukraine - European Union Association could 
cause, at a conservative estimate, about 100 billion RUB damage to the Russian 
economy and some sectors of the Russian industry and agroindustrial complex 
would find themselves at the risk of negative effects with regard to economic 
growth and public employment (Rossiya riskuyet, 2014).  
If Russia could annex the Ukrainian territories by force it would have a 
chance to get possession of the Ukrainian resources and pretend for the 
superpower status (Kaspruk, 2019). Thus, one of the warfare reasons was the 
struggle for the human, territorial and financial resources. As a result of the 
annexation of the Crimea, the Kremlin obtained control over the oil and gas 
production and fossil fuels transportation to Europe. Today, oil and gas are 
mainly produced at the drilling platforms in the Black and the Azov Seas that 
were declared “nationalized” by the new government of the Crimea. By expert 
estimates, the prime cost of the offshore oil and gas production is 1.7-2.5 times 
higher than the Siberian analogues in Russia but it can be compared to the 
transportation price to this region at the world prices. Russia is interested in the 
unexplored and potentially large hydrocarbon resources in the region (Ryzhkin, 
2014). 
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Contrary to the Crimea that has no great industrial potential, the Eastern 
Ukraine is an industrial and mineral mining region of Ukraine.  
In 2013, Donetsk region provided about 18% of the total industrial 
production in the country with the 10% population of Ukraine. Coal and steel 
industries were the main manufacturing sectors. Non-ferrous metal industry, 
salt production, chemical industry, various machinery manufacturing, 
metalworking, glassmaking and building materials manufacturing are also 
well-developed.  
Donetsk region also has the best developed railway network in the former 
Soviet Union. The greater part of electric power is provided at the coal power 
stations and wind farms. 
Most enterprises of Donetsk Coal Basin are in the territory of Donetsk 
region. The development of Donbas resources took place from east to west; that 
is why the most perspective coal fields are now in the west though anthracite is 
mined in the eastern part of the region.  
Mining industry supplies the raw materials for the regional enterprises as 
well as provides for the most needs of the metal industry of the country in the 
non-metallic minerals (dolomite, fluxing limestone, fireclay, moulding sand). 
Besides, one of the biggest mercury deposits in the former USSR was 
developed in Horlivka that is now the biggest in Ukraine.  
Luhansk region is one of the top-five industrial-economic regions of 
Ukraine. This area concentrates about 4.6% of the main funds of the country 
and about 5% of labor resources. 
The region has a multi-industry potential with the accent on the heavy 
industry. Fuel and energy complex is the leader of the industry with the key 
role of the mining industry and coal enterprises. The region also has powerful 
oil refinery facilities, railway facilities production, metal-cutting machinery 
production, calcined soda, synthetic resins and plastics, windowpane and 
cardboard production (Gusev, 2015; Slovska, 2020, р. 214-215).  
Thus, there were no armed conflicts or human losses in the Crimea. RF did 
not annex the Crimea by force but it provided the background for the pseudo-
referendum and further annexation with the help of special forces and the army 
(Larionov, 2014; Pankevych, 2018, p. 202-203).  
As of February 26-27, 2014, according to the official staff data, there were 
a total number of 20,315 Ukrainian military personnel and the uniformed 
services in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. This number takes into 
consideration all the units and the manpower of the Ministry of Emergency 
Situations and all the governmental authorities that had the rights and 
instruments to exercise the powerful functions such as prosecution authorities 
and the judiciary.  
These forces of the Ukrainian Army included 13,468 militaries, 2,560 of 
the National Guard, 1,860 of the State Border Service, 1,614 of the Security 
Service of Ukraine (officers), 527 of the Department of State Guard and 274 of 
the State Space Agency of Ukraine. 
From February through May 2014, only 6,010 of the 20,315 militaries had 
arrived in the mainland Ukraine including 3,990 of the Ukrainian Army, 1,177 
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of the National Guard, 519 of the State Border Service, 242 of the Security 
Service of Ukraine, 20 of the Department of State Guard and 61 of the State 
Space Agency of Ukraine. 14,062 troops did not arrive at their permanent 
stations and stayed in the occupied territory of the Crimea including 9,500 of 
the Ukrainian Army, 1,386 of the National Guard, 1,350 of the State Border 
Service, 1,372 of the Security Service of Ukraine, 500 of the Department of 
State Guard and 507 of the State Space Agency of Ukraine (Matios 
obnarodoval, 2016). 
About 16 airdromes with the military equipment and service infrastructure 
as well as about 40% of the aircraft fleet of Ukraine were left in the Crimea. 
189 military units and institutions of the Military Forces of Ukraine joined 
Russia.  
Such a quick reversion of the Ukrainian troops over the Russian command 
might be attributed to several reasons. First, as of 2014, during 23 years of 
Ukrainian independence, combat effective military units had been turned into 
the scrap iron depots, the best military staff had been lost and the property had 
been sold and filed away in storage as the army management and maintenance 
during peaceful times seemed burdensome to the state budget.  
Second, after the Revolution of Honor (November 21, 2013 through 
February 2014), the entire governmental system, including the army, was 
demoralized and there was much talk among the Ukrainian militaries in the 
Crimea about the legitimacy of the new authorities, including the military. The 
uncertainty of future army service made the militaries feel even more 
demoralized. With the deepening of the economic crisis, the declarations of the 
new government about the lack of money in the budget and the possible cuts of 
some budget items (including the military ones) as well as the arrears in the 
salaries and financial aids payment to the Crimean militaries for over 1.5 
months, the main staff of the Military Forces of Ukraine expressed more and 
more discontent and disapproval. At the same time, Russian propagandists 
agitated the Ukrainian militaries to join the Russian army. The Russian 
arguments were quite strong: stability and high financial standards. For 
example, the salary of a Russian lieutenant is about 1,200 USD, the highest 
salary for the post-Soviet countries and can be compared to the salary in the 
Israeli army (from 1,200 to 1,800 USD). At the same time, the Ukrainian 
lieutenant made about 180 USD per month. 
Third, a great number of the militaries of the Ukrainian Army were the 
locals. They did not want to leave the Crimea and were favorably disposed to 
Russia. There is significant evidence of campaigning on the part of the locals 
and of the families on the Ukrainian militaries pressing them to move to the 
Russian authority.  
There is one more aspect. Many people in Ukraine saw Russia as a USSR 
successor and they saw nothing tragic or unexpected in annexing the Ukrainian 
territories to Russia (Ryzhkin, 2014; Kak Rossiya, 2018). 
The above reasons for the annexation of Crimea are relevant in explaining 
the conquest of Donbas by Russian troops. This region was one of the “the most 
Russian” in the national composition of the population due to Holodomor or 
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Terror Famine – the real act of genocide of the Ukrainians organized by the 
Soviet government by means of creating an artificial mass famine in 1932–33. 
According to some historians, about 3,941 million people died in Ukraine 
(except for the western regions, the Crimea and South Bessarabia that did not 
belong to Ukraine at those times but are the parts of it nowadays). Russians and 
other nationalities arrived instead of the died and the deported (mass ethnic 
cleansing in pre–war, war and post-war period of World War II). They had no 
mental relationship with this area and brought their culture and language to the 
new territories (Holodomor, 2018; Blednov, 2008, р. 295; Shurhalo, 2019). 
Economic (powerful industrial area), political (reluctance of Ukraine to 
join NATO and the EU) and ethnic reasons (pro-Russian sentiment due to the 
majority of non-Ukrainians by nationality) served the rapid advance of the 
Russian troops in Donbas and their support by the local people. 
 
Military conflict realia  
The Crimea is a separate administrative unit of Ukraine that was annexed 
for the Russian Federation at the beginning of 2014. 
The war came to Donbas starting in March when anti-government protests 
expanded and turned into the seizure of the administrative buildings in Luhansk 
and Donetsk and other places of these regions. People called for the 
organization of so-called Luhansk and Donetsk “people's republics”.  
On April 12 the armed combatants, under the command of the former 
Russian military Igor Girkin, seized Sloviansk in the Donetsk region. Olexandr 
Turchynov, who at that time was acting as the President of Ukraine, declared 
the beginning of the anti-terrorist operation (ATO) in the east of the country. 
In 2014, Ukraine and the Ukrainians felt the need for the Ukrainian army, 
though the combat effectiveness of the army was quite a low level at that time, 
due to 23 years of total corruption, plundering and ageing of the equipment and 
facilities and the staff cuts. Ukrainian men took up arms voluntarily and many 
volunteer battalions were created. Many people were recruited to the Ukrainian 
Military Forces and the National Guard revived.  
At the same time, the combatants seized most of the cities of Donbas. The 
Ukrainian troops tried in vain to bring the border with two RF regions under 
control. The occupied territories were quickly packed with Russian-made heavy 
weapons. Tank and armored vehicle convoys moved freely across the Donbas 
steppes.  
During the summer of 2014, ATO forces wrested Mariupol from the 
enemy, regained control over Sloviansk, Kramatorsk and other places in 
Donbas. The combatants occupied Donetsk and Luhansk and Ukraine lost 
control over the border between the Donetsk and Luhansk regions and Russia.  
On July 17, 2014 the separatists shot down Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 
over the separatist-controlled part of Donetsk region, killing 298 people (Viyna 
na Donbasi, 2019). This was tantamount to a war crime. 
The dynamics of the conflict development is always marked with the 
changes of the character of the conflict. It can develop more or less positively 
but the conflict settlement trends are often complicated in this case: the conflict 
 
Military conflict in Ukraine: Ukraine’s ans world’s challenges 
 
Balkan Social Science Review Vol.16, December 2020, 197- 213               207 
 
situation gets worse and worse that is usually known as a conflict escalation. 
The fight for a definite status, power, material and human resources ends with 
the full or partial satisfaction of the aims of the stronger adversary. At the time 
of detente, as soon as the adversary’s aims are neutralized, the contradictions 
between people and social groups become settled (Coser, 1967, p. 8).  
Russian aggression against Ukraine with the violation of the provisions 
and principles of UN Charter caused 13 thousand killed (about 4-5 thousand of 
them were militaries) and 28 thousand wounded (Russia Occupied). After the 
conflict became less intense, the number of civilians killed considerably 
reduced. By the estimates of the United Nation High Commissioner for Human 
Rights, the share of the civilians killed in the conflict in 2014 made 33-34% 
whereas it was 10-11% in 2018 (Miller, 2019). 
The annexation of the Crimea, making Donbas a battlefield and further 
aggressive expansion to the Azov and Black Seas and the Kerch Straits, resulted 
in the occupation of 44 thousand sq.km. or 7% of the territory of Ukraine 
including the Crimea and the eastern parts of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. 
Over 1.8 million of the residents of the Crimea and Donbas (as for August 2018) 
had to leave their homes. Ukraine lost about 13% of its population through their 
residing in the temporarily occupied territories. 
International organizations speak of 2 million refugees, over 40 thousand 
ruined residence buildings, schools and hospitals. There is no exact data for 
missing people. Official statistics mention over 400 missing, whereas the 
International Committee of the Red Cross mentions a number that is four times 
greater. 
Ukraine modified and increased its army to twice its pre-invasion size - up 
to 255 thousand people. It received American Javelins and launched the 
production of its own missiles. Still, it almost lost the Azov Sea area. The port 
blockade caused great losses to the industry of the region. Last year experts 
spoke of approximately 100 billion USD losses (Tysyachi pogibshikh, (n.d.). 
As a consequence of the warfare, Ukraine and Russia broke their 
scientific-technical and military bonds which caused the need for closed-cycle 
production of basic weapons and military equipment in Ukraine by means of 
technological infrastructure innovations at the existing enterprises and the 
launch of new Ukrainian and international defence enterprises in cooperation 
with other countries.  
It has become obvious that the liberal world order is becoming a thing of 
the past. A further hybrid war against Ukraine this year will result in the gradual 
depletion of the country while there is the possibility of dilution/cancellation of 
international sanctions against Russia. Under these circumstances, the Russian-
Ukrainian conflict settlement requires the search for new and more fair-minded 
solutions. Delaying the conflict settlement will surely result in the “frozen 
conflict” that automatically dooms the European and NATO prospects for 
Ukraine for an indefinite term and can even cause the chance of Ukrainian 
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Conclusions  
The military conflict in Ukraine has lasted from at least 2014 to 2020. The 
Russian Federation violated the principles and standards of international law 
and annexed the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and some parts of Donetsk 
and Luhansk regions. Considerable human and material losses is the price 
Ukraine paid for its endeavors to become a part of the western world. 
About a century separates us from the days when the Bolshevik regime led 
by V. Lenin eliminated Ukraine and implanted the new type of democracy - 
“the democracy of the working class” that became the beginning of mass terror 
against all nationalities and ethnoses that populated the former Russian Empire. 
Fanatics of the Revolution eliminated separate social groups trying to found a 
new Soviet great state. The current warfare became an extension of this 
Russian-Ukrainian confrontation. 
In the new reality, post-Soviet “democratic” Russia is trying to “swallow 
up” Ukraine applying the methods of so-called hybrid war, for which we were 
not ready. This aggression manifests itself through the use of the conventional 
armed forces, special operation forces and non-traditional forces, the military 
element. Civilian element includes political, ideological, information and 
economic activities.  
The military conflict in Ukraine is marked with war crimes, violation of 
human rights and crimes against humanity. This became possible because to 
the systemic preparatory measures Russia applied during the dozens of years 
before the immediate conflict, including the work of the security services, 
elimination of the defence by the pro-Russian staff, ideological propaganda, 
bribery, blackmail, mass murders and deportations of the Ukrainian population 
and populating the territories with Russians that wanted to return to their ethnic 
motherland (so-called “ethnic cleansing”). 
For the present, the Russian-Ukrainian war is on the agenda of both 
Ukraine and other world countries. The undeterred aggression allows for 
another redrawing of the political map of the world due to the contrived 
ideological, language or religious confrontation, forwarded by the Kremlin. 
Any social conflict turns into the warfare for the purpose of the radical 
reformation of the present political order with a resulting geopolitical tragedy. 
All intentions of the people of one country or another to change the policy 
offered by the national government and parliament should not be realized in the 
form of military conflict, which might well be followed by active intervention 
by an outside element, such as the Russian special services. 
For Ukraine, the loss of the Crimea and the “frozen conflict” in the Donbas 
region has had serious negative internal political consequences. At the same 
time, the war united the nation, for which the ranks of the Armed Forces of 
Ukraine, the National Guard of Ukraine, voluntary units and mass volunteer 
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